

PART 1: Analysis

CHAPTER 2: What influences migrant integration outcomes?

In the analysis report we present **three different types of factors** that influence integration outcomes¹⁰. First we look at the immigrant population and individual factors.¹¹ Secondly we consider general policies and factors associated with the macro-level structure of receiving societies with regards to the labour market, education systems, social policies and the political context. Thirdly, we look at migration and integration policies and factors related to specific migration and targeted integration policies. Individual-level factors have been explored most extensively by research as large-scale surveys and administrative data make available suitable sources for analysis. In comparison, general policies and context as well as migration and integration policies remain under-researched as suitable data is more difficult to obtain and statistical analysis more demanding.

Clearly, the situation of immigrants across countries is rather different, as well as their situation in comparison to non-immigrants. However, the project's analysis has found some evidence that countries with better social inclusion outcomes (e.g. income) are also the countries with better education outcomes. In countries where the difference in reading performance at age 15 between foreign-born immigrants and non-immigrants is larger, the share of foreign-born immigrants below the median income level is higher. We also find that in countries where a higher share of foreign-born immigrants have below median incomes compared to non-immigrants, they tend to achieve basic education a

lot less than non-immigrants.¹² This also means that there may be an underexplored overlap between different areas of integration, such as employment, education, social inclusion and active citizenship. It is important to consider all areas relevant for integration and analyse the links between the different areas. Outcomes in one area may very well have positive or negative effects on the other.

Not one single set of factors is able to explain the situation of immigrants or all differences between immigrants and non-immigrants in EU countries. For example, socio-economic status and residence influence education and employment outcomes to a large degree. However, the social status cannot explain everything. The reading performance of 15 year old foreign-born immigrants from the same country of origin and with similar background varies across different EU countries. The second generation also show large education gaps even though they were born in the country of residence and have equal residence periods. Accounting for social status reduces the education gap between immigrants and non-immigrants significantly in many countries, however, differences remain. This means that other factors such as general policies and national context as well as specific immigration and integration policies shape integration outcomes.

2.1 Migrant population

The first set of factors that directly influence integration outcomes relate to the immigrant population. This is to say that the composition of the immigrant population in a country will have an impact on integration outcomes. The composition of migrant populations is shaped by many factors (e.g. history, geography and migration policies).

Migrant population factors can be distinguished as **demographic** (gender, age, family status, citizenship, country of birth (first or second generation), country of birth of the parents, length of residence/and age of arrival), **socio-economic**

(10) In the context of migrant integration indicators, the term 'outcome' describes a (statistical) result of a certain indicator, usually measured in rates. Outcomes are compared between immigrants and non-immigrants (gaps). In general, outcomes of indicators can describe the situation of integration of immigrants in a certain area of society.

(11) If not indicated otherwise, the term 'immigrant' generally includes both first or second generation and both EU national or Third Country Nationals.

(12) For a full list of correlations between indicators, see the annex. These calculations are provided by David Reichel from the International Centre for Migration Policy Development.

(education, employment, income, occupation, level of development of country of origin) and **socio-cultural** characteristics (mother tongue, language acquisition).¹³

2.1.1 Which migrant population characteristics influence employment outcomes?

With few exceptions from southern EU countries and EU-12, the first and second generation is generally less likely to be employed than the non-immigrant population. In general, immigrant men achieve similar employment rates than non-immigrants. The overall difference can largely be explained by low rates for women, especially from outside the EU. Highly skilled immigrants are more likely to be unemployed than low skilled immigrants. Highly skilled immigrants are also more likely to be overqualified than non-immigrants, especially if they were born outside the EU.

Age, residence, gender

Just like for the non-immigrant population, employment outcomes improve with working age and residence. Nevertheless, equal years of residence do not erase the disadvantage of immigrants (migrant penalty). Second-generation immigrants with equal residence than non-immigrants show relatively lower outcomes on the labour market in many EU-15 countries.

Women's labour market outcomes are usually lower than men's, especially when they were born in non-EU countries. Foreign-born immigrant women between 20-29 years are more likely to be married and have children than non-immigrant women in most EU countries. The project's analysis shows that countries where there are more foreign-born immigrant households with one or more children, foreign-born migrants are also more likely to be at risk of poverty. Countries where fewer foreign-born migrant women have primary education than non-immigrants, foreign-born immigrant women also have lower employment and labour market outcomes. This is not the case for men. Children have a greater negative effect on labour market participation of foreign-born immigrant women than on non-immigrant women. Across some EU countries, the risk of being unemployed and not in education is higher for female children of im-

migrants than for males, with the exception of the Scandinavian countries. This suggests that males continue to be the sole breadwinner more often in immigrant families than in non-immigrant families. When they work, foreign-born migrant women are twice as likely to work in low skilled professions as migrant men according to the OECD. This gender gap does not exist for the non-immigrant population in many EU countries.

The policy implications could be that general labour market policies are made more suitable to support younger and more recent immigrants. Targeted labour market programmes and trainings could focus on low skilled and long-term unemployed immigrants, in particular women with children. A review of the impact of family benefits and of gender equality legislation on immigrant women could lead to policy adaptations.

Education

Lower educational levels explain a large part of the differences between employment outcomes of immigrants and non-immigrants. The gaps reduce when accounting for education and socio-economic position of the parents. For some groups, the employment rate of non-EU immigrants is up to five times higher than for non-immigrants. Access to and quality of early childhood education, avoiding social segregation in schools, allowing high permeability between school tracks and supporting immigrants before and during the transition phase into higher education can help to enhance the qualifications of immigrants and break the link between the socio-economic status of immigrants with their parents.

Whereas unemployment tends to be higher for the low-educated for both migrants and the native-born, differences with the non-immigrant population are most pronounced for the highly educated. In many EU countries, low-educated immigrants have a higher employment rate than their native-born peers. This is particularly visible in countries that have had significant low-educated labour migration over the past decade. In contrast, in all countries with significant immigrant populations the highly educated immigrants have lower employment rates than the highly educated native-born. This could mean that the migrant penalty is actually increasing with higher skill levels.

(13) More national research has also focussed on social capital (contacts, networks) and cultural characteristics (religion, attitudes towards receiving society's norms and values) as relevant factors for migrant integration.

Job quality

Employment is not enough to provide equal opportunities for immigrants. Narrow employment gaps can hide other issues of immigrant integration, such as the quality of work. Work quality is usually measured by temporary employment, low-skilled employment, part-time-employment, public sector employment and over-qualification.

In addition to age, educational attainment is clearly an important determinant for accessing higher skilled, better paid jobs. However, higher skills also lead to increased risk of being overqualified. On average, there is virtually no difference in the likelihood to be overqualified between immigrants from high-income countries and the native-born. Eurostat showed that the risk of over qualification is particularly high for recent immigrants from non-EU countries. Their formal qualifications are thus highly discounted in the labour markets of high-income EU countries. The discount is mainly observed for those who have obtained their qualifications in low-income countries. In contrast, immigrants trained in the country of residence have similar over-qualification rates than the native-born and always lower than those who have acquired their qualifications abroad according to the OECD. Easier and more accessible recognition procedures, equivalence courses and European cooperation could facilitate the recognition of qualifications and skills for immigrants.

2.1.2 Which migrant population characteristics influence education outcomes?

Education outcomes vary considerably across country and across different indicators. In most EU countries, the first and second generation have on average lower educational attainment, leave school early more often and perform worse in reading at the age of 15. The educational disadvantage is less pronounced in terms of tertiary education (e.g. university).

Residence

The OECD found that years of schooling in the country of residence is a relevant factor for the reading performance of migrant students at age 15. First-generation students who arrived in the country at a younger age outperform those who arrived when they were older. Education systems are better able to improve student performance when they have a longer opportunity to shape the learning outcomes of immigrant students. The policy implication could be that general education policies accommodate recent immigrants

by providing homework and other general school support for the young, language tuition for all, equivalence classes and access to life-long learning for adult immigrants. Targeted policies can effectively tackle longer settled groups with lower achievement.

Socio-economic background

Parents' education and socio-economic position are one of the key explanatory factors of the lower outcomes of immigrants observed in EU countries, especially for the second generation. Bivariate analysis shows that there is a clear relationship between the average socio-economic status of the foreign-born population and underachievement in education. Immigrants perform worse in countries where the foreign-born immigrant population is on average poorer than the total population. Foreign-born residents in richer and more equal societies often have a lower socio-economic status than the native-born; by extension, their children often have higher rates of underachievement. Central and Southern European countries tend to have foreign-born populations with a similar – if not higher – socio-economic status compared to the native-born and, thus, little-to-no-gap in achievement between foreign- and native-born students. Socio-economic status and educational level of parents appear to explain almost all the educational disadvantages of children of immigrants from high-income countries, but only half of the disadvantage of the children from lower-income countries. To reduce the link and decrease socio-economic segregation in schools, various measures can be introduced, such as increasing the hours spent in school, improving the quality of teaching, delaying the age of tracking and supporting students before and during the transition into higher education. Smaller classes and parental involvement projects have proven effective in many cases to boost outcomes of immigrant children.

Language spoken at home

The language spoken at home has an influence on the education of immigrants. Students that speak the language of instruction at home are much more likely to perform better in schools. In this regard, getting parents more involved in their children's education has proven to be an effective strategy to improve education outcomes of children.

Other socio-cultural factors that influence education outcomes refer to different national, religious or ethnic backgrounds (sometimes called

'cultural proximity'). Some researchers find that immigrants' general attitudes towards education and motivational orientations may support or hinder the integration process. Cultural factors have also been used to account for differences in school success between immigrant groups. This research often focuses on the relatively high achievement levels of influence from some Asian countries and lower achievement levels of immigrants from Muslim-majority countries.

2.1.3 Which migrant population characteristics influence social inclusion outcomes?

Social inclusion is a broad and interconnected area including poverty, income, health and housing. On average, foreign-born immigrants are at a higher risk of poverty, have lower incomes and more often live in overcrowded housing. Instruments of social inclusion include social policies (e.g. benefits, spending, taxes) and housing policy (e.g. availability of social housing and competitiveness of housing market).

As is the case for non-immigrants, common socio-demographic characteristics improve social inclusion outcomes over time. The project's bivariate analysis suggests that higher age, income, education, employment and duration of residence are all associated with better social inclusion of foreign-born immigrants in terms of higher incomes and lower poverty risk.

Household composition

We found a strong influence of household composition on the income of the foreign-born population. Foreign-born families without children have similar incomes compared to the total population. However, the income gap is larger for foreign-born immigrants with children. Children widen the difference in incomes between foreign-born immigrants and the total population. The same pattern applies to poverty risk. The foreign-born are more likely to be at risk of poverty compared to the native born when they have children. More research is needed on the impact of family-related benefits, family structure and poverty on immigrant integration.

2.1.4 Which migrant population characteristics influence active citizenship outcomes?

Currently, naturalisation rates, long-term residence rates, and immigrants among elected representatives have been proposed as relevant EU active citizenship indicators. Available research focuses on naturalisation and other forms of political participation such as voting, volunteering and membership and or participation in organisations. There is very limited international research on long-term residence. Some case studies have collected information on immigrants in elected offices.¹⁴

Based on data from the European Social Survey (ESS), researchers found that immigrants' political involvement in terms of membership and voting in the EU is generally lower than among native-born. However, a different picture emerges when observers take into account informal participation in humanitarian aid, human rights, and immigrant rights movements where participants are often not registered as members. On average, voter turnout in elections shows lower participation of immigrants compared to non-immigrants in EU countries. However, this gap is reduced significantly when the results are controlled for age and education.

Employment, education, family status

Citizenship is the prerequisite for voting at the national level in nearly all EU countries and at the regional level in the majority of EU countries. Analysis based on ESS data also indicated that citizenship increases other forms of civic participation (e.g. helping others in society). The main individual predictors of naturalisation have been first identified in the United States and largely confirmed in national and comparative studies in Europe. Rates are higher among the second generation, especially of mixed parentage. Participation often increases as immigrants spend more time in the country and naturalise. Duration of residence and marriage are the only significant determinants of naturalisation for immigrants from both developed and developing countries. Other relevant individual-level factors include employment, income levels, education, language ability, family status, and social contacts.

(14) See, Bird et al (2011), Morales et al (2011) in the further reading list and a graph from Kirchberger et al (2011) in the annex.

Country of origin and language skills

Several studies have found that immigrants from lower developed and politically unstable countries are more likely to naturalise. Recent analysis showed that foreign-born immigrants from low-or-medium-developed countries are on average five times as likely to naturalise as immigrants from highly-developed countries. In most EU countries, people from developed (especially EU) countries tend to naturalise less because they have less incentives to acquire the citizenship of another EU country. In addition, educational attainment and speaking the country's language at home increases the likelihood to naturalise for immigrants from developing countries, but has no effect on immigrants from developed countries. Low-educated immigrants from a high-income country are more likely than their highly educated counterparts to be nationals. On the contrary, among immigrants originating from a lower-income country, those that are highly educated are more likely to be nationals than their low-educated counterparts.

Residence

In most EU countries, immigrant's (self-reported) electoral participation increases the longer they have settled in the country. According to the OECD, in Finland, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom, long-term residents' voter turnout is more than 10 percentage points higher than the turnout of immigrants in general. Furthermore, in several countries – Hungary, Israel and the United Kingdom – participation rates for long-term residents appear higher than those of native-born.

Subjective factors

More subjective indicators, such as 'sense of belonging', 'interest in politics', 'experience of discrimination' and 'trust in political institutions' have been mentioned in the context of active citizenship. More research is being done on the question how these subjective indicators may also influence more 'objective' active citizenship indicators, for example, voting and membership and/or participation in organisations. This research is still at the beginning. So far, there are mixed results about how these indicators are related to the various forms of political participation.

2.2 General policies and context

The second set of factors that influence integration outcomes are 'general policies and context'. This set of factors takes into account different national contexts across the EU. Broadly defined,

they include labour market structures and economic growth, the education system, the welfare system, the housing market, and public opinion. In general, less is known about the relative importance of macro-level factors compared to well-researched individual level factors.

Explaining macro-level factors

Labour market factors include economic growth, occupational sectors, occupational conditions, minimum wages, and labour laws. Employment rates in relation to overall economic growth give an indication whether immigrants benefit equally in good times or suffer disproportionately in bad times. The employment sectors can influence immigrants' employment rate as sectors that require less qualifications and social skills (i.e. agricultural sector) are often easier for immigrants to access. However, skill-demanding labour markets and the less accessible high skilled jobs increase the risk of over-qualification for immigrants. The project's bivariate analysis suggests that foreign-born immigrants are disproportionately affected by part-time and temporary work. They seem to be the first one in and out of the labour market. In this regard, employment protection legislation – a measurement of how easy firms can hire and fire workers – can have an impact on immigrant employment. In theory, tight labour laws decrease the propensity of companies to hire workers. This could disadvantage immigrants in competition with non-immigrants.

Education systems are very diverse across the EU. Different systems impact the performance of immigrants. Some of the better researched characteristics of education systems are access and availability of early-childhood education, the age of ability grouping (tracking), socio-economic composition of schools, the diversification of schools tracks, and public spending on education. Others may be mandatory school years, grade repetition, class sizes, number of school hours and centralised curricula. In some cases, these aspects have helped immigrants to overcome their often unfavourable socio-economic background and discrimination in order to achieve higher qualifications.

Basic income and housing are essential human needs. They are regarded as prerequisites for structural integration in society. The link between welfare systems, housing and migrant integration remains under-researched. So far, considerably more attention has been paid to employment and education. Some countries measure the uptake of social services of immigrants. Other research has looked at how social transfers affect the poverty risk of immigrants compared to non-immigrants.

Social transfers include family related benefits, housing benefits, age-related benefits, unemployment benefits and social assistance. The extent to which EU governments provide these benefits is reflected in overall social spending as percentage of GDP and general welfare generosity indices. The housing market is closely related to social issues. Are immigrants living in overcrowded accommodation, how many own property, how relevant is social housing in a country, how much do immigrants spend on rent relative to their income? The answers to these questions have an influence on the social inclusion of immigrants.

Lastly, public opinion can influence integration outcomes. Public opinion can be considered an umbrella term reflecting the more subjective indicators of receiving societies. This can be measured through public attitudes, (awareness of) discrimination and media discourse. In some countries, surveys indicate high levels of anti-immigrant attitudes. Surveys and experimental studies have shown high degrees of discrimination against immigrants, especially in schools and at the work place. Several international studies have also analysed the media coverage of immigration and integration issues. They often find a negative bias of migrant integration issues in many EU countries.

2.2.1 Which context factors influence employment outcomes?

Presumably, a positive economic situation overall will benefit immigrants. More growth is likely to increase migrant employment. Generally, the project's bivariate analysis has shown that employment rates of foreign-born immigrants are better in countries where non-immigrants also have higher employment rates. However, while immigrants take advantage of economic opportunities in good times, the financial crisis has shown that immigrants are the first to exit the labour market when times are more difficult. Immigrants were affected most by the economic downturn in once booming new countries of immigration. In addition, regional and local differences in the labour market influence integration as immigrants face very different opportunities in different places. Immigrants often move to places due to existing social networks, not necessarily due to labour market needs.

Employment sectors

The project's bivariate analysis shows that countries with larger agricultural sectors tend to have narrower gaps in female employment rates and somewhat narrower gaps in male employment rates. Foreign-born non-EU immigrant women

are also less active compared to non-immigrant women in countries with larger service sectors. This suggests that service unrelated work (agriculture, industry) is favourable for the employment of non-EU immigrant women. On average across the EU, immigrants are overrepresented in low-skilled sectors such as construction, accommodation and food services and underrepresented in higher skilled jobs including public sector jobs. The second generation are less likely to work in public administration, health and social work or education than non-immigrants. In some countries, these public sector jobs represent a large share of the labour market, offering stable work conditions. Large differences in employment rates with offspring of native-born in Belgium and Spain are partly explained by the low share of employment in the public sector among native-born offspring of immigrants. Public sector employment targets and information campaigns can increase application rates of eligible immigrants. This has the potential to enhance the employment situation in addition to raising public awareness of diversity.

Country of origin, legal restrictions, minimum wages

The general level of development of the country of residence matters. There are greater differences in labour market participation between the general population and the non-EU-born in countries with higher levels of human development. Legal restrictions to access to labour markets for family and humanitarian migrants in some countries can have an effect on employment outcomes.

There is some evidence that minimum wages set too high or excessively restrictive employment protection legislation could increase the level of structural unemployment and make it especially difficult for new arrivals to find work.

Discrimination and public opinion

One context factor that has yielded more research results is discrimination. The most convincing studies of the occurrence of discrimination are field experiments, which test the actual behaviour of employers seeking to fill job vacancies. Job seekers with 'foreign' names have to submit twice as many applications to be invited for an interview than other job seekers with the exact same qualification. Studies on discrimination in the labour market in Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States – following a standard procedure for correspondence testing developed by the International Labour Organization (ILO) in 1992, showed similar tendencies.

Based on the projects' bivariate analysis, we find that countries where foreign-born immigrants have lower integration outcomes, the awareness of discrimination among the general population is higher. The project's analysis found that lower levels of labour market participation for non-EU-born women and men are associated with greater public awareness of discrimination against foreigners. However, the direction of causation is not clear. Foreign-born immigrants may have lower outcomes because they are being discriminated against or, they are being discriminated against because they have lower outcomes. Interestingly, the countries with higher awareness of discrimination are often the countries with more inclusive integration policies, in particular strong anti-discrimination laws and extensive labour market integration policies. We also found that countries with high support for equal rights for legal immigrants also adopt more inclusive integration policies. This indicates that countries with greater challenges to integrate immigrants, higher perceived levels of discrimination and more favourable attitudes towards immigrants are also the countries that adopt more ambitious anti-discrimination and labour market policies.

Some have argued that public opinion, indeed, can be relevant for employment outcomes of immigrants beyond discrimination on the labour market. Anti-immigrant perceptions restrict government's ability to promote high-skilled labour migration which European companies are in need of.

Discrimination awareness training for employers, anonymous job applications, strong implementation of anti-discrimination legislation and public anti-discrimination campaigns have the potential to reduce the impact of discrimination and negative public opinion on employment of immigrants.

2.2.2 Which context factors influence education outcomes?

The type of education system matters. The level of underachievement among immigrant students and the general population are linked. As a general trend, the share of underachievers among foreign-born immigrant students is higher in countries with more underachievers within the general population. We have also found that the share of the foreign-born with a university degree is higher in countries with more university graduates within the general population. More migrants leave school early in countries with a larger share of early school leavers within the general population. This performance correla-

tion across all four education indicators implies that the general educational system is a major factor for the general population, including for migrants. Where the general population fares better, migrants generally also do better.

Overall performance of education system

The project's bivariate analysis has found that higher levels of spending on education as percentage of GDP is associated with higher reading scores of 15 year old immigrants. While rates for foreign-born immigrants might generally be higher in countries that spend more on education, the differences between foreign-born immigrants and non-immigrants are also larger. The difference (gap) between foreign-born immigrants and the general population is greater in countries with greater levels of wealth and equality within the general population. There are often more underachievers among foreign-born immigrant students than among the general student body in countries where natives have a relatively high socio-economic position. This finding suggests that a country with a wealthier, equal, and educated general population will be more likely to have greater student achievement gaps between the general population and foreign-born immigrants. In poorer and more unequal societies, native students are often just as affected by underachievement as migrant students. Even though migrants generally do better in countries where everybody does better, the differences between migrants and natives appear to be larger in countries where the general population has better conditions for high performance. Generally, this analysis finds different situations in many North and Northwest European countries in comparison to many Central and Southern European countries.

School segregation

School segregation can be considered one relevant factor influencing the education of immigrants. Several studies show that students with an immigrant background tend to face the double challenge of coming from a disadvantaged background themselves and going to a school with a more disadvantaged profile (measured by the average socio-economic background of a school's influence) - both of which are negatively related with student performance. While there may be a negative effect of ethnic segregation, it appears that its impact is considerably smaller than the effect of the socio-economic position of the parents. This means that the issue is not ethnic segregation of schools but socio-economic segregation. There is evidence that the outcomes of immigrant

children can be improved by decreasing socio-economic segregation in schools, increasing the hours spent in school, improving the quality of teaching, delaying the age of tracking and supporting students before and during the transition into higher education. Smaller classes and parental involvement projects have also proven to be effective in many cases for improving immigrant children's outcomes.

Tracking

The impact of tracking - where students are grouped in different school tracks at different ages according to their abilities - is very much debated in research circles. Generally, there is a large body of evidence suggesting that both native and migrant students have, on average, higher scores in comprehensive educational systems compared with similar students in highly stratified educational systems. According to the OECD, almost all of the countries with large performance gaps tend to have greater differentiation in their school systems. Many studies have found evidence that early division of students into tracks increases outcome gaps over time. Some researchers have found that students in schools with generally poorer students do better in comprehensive systems (one-track) than in multi-tracked systems. In short, poorer students in schools with on average poorer classmates benefit most from comprehensive schools systems. However, others contend that some effects of the tracked education system might actually be due to differences in the composition of the migrant population.

Discrimination

Institutional discrimination is a possible explanation for lower migrant achievement, especially when other factors are insufficient to explain persistent differences between immigrants and non-immigrants. Discrimination may occur in terms of teacher's decision on grade repetition, tracking and referral to special education programmes. In addition, textbooks and teaching materials may not reflect the diversity of influence' cultural and language backgrounds. Many studies across Europe have found that immigrants are more likely to go to a lower track school even when they have similar grades than their non-immigrants peers. This can be due to discrimination by teachers but also the choices of parents. Discrimination could be reduced through discrimination awareness training, support for teachers teaching second language students, more objective decision making procedures at transition periods in school careers, and more intensive guidance.

2.2.3 Which context factors influence social inclusion outcomes?

Some evidence for most high-income EU countries shows that generous countries with strong redistributive welfare states also have strong antipoverty policies that help alleviate material deprivation for both immigrants as well as non-immigrants within each country. Studies have shown that tax-benefit programs reduce child poverty of immigrants significantly. Another study finds that family benefits have a positive effect on immigrants in some countries when they are designed to accommodate migrant families, which are usually bigger than native-born families.

Benefits and social spending

The foreign-born population are more likely to receive benefits than natives in countries where they are relatively poorer than natives. Countries with higher income gaps and higher poverty risk among foreign-born immigrants also have higher levels of social spending. In countries where foreign-born immigrants are at greater risk of poverty and earn less income, the foreign-born population is also more likely to receive unemployment benefits compared to non-immigrants. These countries also spend more on social benefits. This suggests that countries that spend more on social benefits may protect immigrants from the worst; however, they do not significantly reduce income and poverty gaps between immigrants and non-immigrants.

Housing

Poor housing is often related to poverty. The project's bivariate analysis shows that 'overcrowding' is related to both income levels and poverty risk of foreign-born immigrants. This means that the foreign-born have less income and a higher risk of poverty in countries where they live in worse housing conditions compared to the total population. The importance of housing is reflected in many of EU countries' migrant integration monitoring. Nevertheless, the link between housing and migrant integration remains under-researched.

Discrimination

Similar to labour market outcomes, social inclusion outcomes of immigrants are associated with awareness of discrimination. Based on the project's bivariate analysis, we see that the public perceives higher levels of discrimination against foreigners in countries with lower rela-

tive income of the foreign-born population and higher relative poverty risk. This suggests that higher levels of perceived discrimination against foreigners are associated with larger income gaps between foreign-born immigrants and native-born.

Contrary to a common belief that immigrants receive disproportional amounts of social benefits, the outlined factors may cause an 'under-use' of benefits for immigrants. The EU funded study 'active inclusion of immigrants' found that immigrants take up less welfare than non-immigrants in most European countries if we consider similar social backgrounds and different kinds of benefits. Studies in Germany have also shown that foreign-born immigrants benefit less in terms of poverty reduction from the system of redistribution (for example through taxes, and social insurance contributions) than natives. The relative under-use of welfare benefits of immigrants might fit the hypothesis that they have limited access to services due to linguistic, cultural, social or discrimination issues. In addition, legal barriers that influence welfare eligibility could limit access to poverty reducing services for immigrants. More research is needed to analyse access, uptake and impact of social services on the situation of immigrants.

2.2.4 Which context factors influence active citizenship outcomes?

Generally, immigrants, regardless of their ethnic origin, are more politically active in the countries where natives are most politically active (North and Northwest Europe). It appears that the general political environment influences active citizenship outcomes just as the labour market and the education system influence employment and education outcomes.

The impact of citizenship policies on active citizenship outcomes will be covered in the following section on migration and integration policies.

2.3 Migration and integration policies

The third and last set of factors that influences integration outcomes are specific migration and targeted integration policies. Migration and integration policies are difficult to use as explanatory factors for the EU migrant integration indicators due to limited comparative data. The link between policies and outcomes is often not direct, difficult to prove and interpret. Research to evaluate the link between policies and outcomes is complex,

cumbersome and costly. It requires very good data and advanced econometric methods for causal evaluations. Existing evaluations are limited to specific policies, countries and target groups. Although increasing in number in the EU, there are generally few comparative and rigorous impact evaluations of policies. The project's analysis and findings from other research provide some first viable insights for further discussion.

Migration policies regulate the inflow of immigrants and are concerned with the question of how many immigrants come into the country through which channel (e.g. labour migrants, family migrants, influence). Generally speaking the evidence suggests that the size of the foreign-born population has no impact on integration outcomes and the difference between immigrants and non-immigrants. Across all indicator areas, the project's analysis could not establish a significant relation between the size of the foreign-born population and integration outcomes. However, there is a relationship between outcomes and the channel of migration. Labour migrants have on average higher qualifications than family or humanitarian migrants. Not surprisingly, some case studies showed that refugees require on average more social benefits than the general population. Some scholars have argued that countries such as Australia and Canada, which have had much more selective immigration policies, tend to exhibit fewer and smaller ethnic penalties than do countries that had major guest-worker programmes. Due to a lack of research, the following will focus only on integration policies. Integration policies address the situation of immigrants after they have settled in the country.

2.3.1 Which policy factors influence employment outcomes?

Targeted labour market policies are defined as public interventions, which are explicitly targeted at groups of persons with difficulties in the labour market, including immigrants. Labour market policies include employment services, activation measures and unemployment benefits. In countries where immigrants have lower employment rates such measures may influence their outcomes. So far, there is limited comparable research on the effectiveness of respective programmes.

There are some evaluations of specific integration programmes in several EU countries, especially with regard to integration courses. Evaluations generally show positive results in terms of improving employment and further education. Because these evaluations vary greatly in terms

of methods and focus, this case study evidence is difficult to compare on an international level.

There is a body of evidence suggesting that citizenship legislation has an impact on employment. Naturalised immigrants generally have better labour market outcomes than foreign nationals, even after controlling for other factors such as education, country of origin and length of stay. Citizenship is believed to open up public sector jobs, reduce discrimination by employers and provide incentives to invest more in education and training. Employers may also take naturalisation as sign of a positive commitment to integrate. There are a couple of case studies, especially in Germany, France, Sweden and the United States that find that naturalisation has an impact on labour market outcomes, in particular of lower skilled immigrants. The findings are, however, difficult to compare across countries.

2.3.2 Which integration policy factors influence education outcomes?

The study of education policies has expanded considerably in recent years. There are numerous approaches and policies. There are also an increasing number of impact evaluations of education policies. According to OECD literature reviews a number of general education policies have affected education outcomes of immigrants in some cases: expenditure per student, hours of language instruction per week, compulsory school years or the age when influence are selected for different tracks of schooling, sustained language support across grade levels; centrally developed curriculum documents; trained teachers in second language teaching; individual assessment of student needs and progress with adequate diagnostic materials; early language interventions and parental involvement in language instruction; a focus on academic language; integration of language and content learning; and the valuing of mother tongues.

Based on rigorous impact evaluations, we can identify certain ‘good policies or programmes’ where a positive effect has been proven in certain circumstances for certain target groups. Based on international literature reviews of impact evaluations, we can find large evidence for a positive effect of early childhood education, parental involvement programmes and class size reductions on the education outcomes. There is modest evidence for positive impact of postponing the age of ability grouping in schools (tracking) and increasing teacher quality. There is mixed evidence for reducing school composition

through allowing parental school choice, paying teachers higher salaries, hiring teachers with a migrant background and language support programmes. There has been very little evidence yet on reducing entire school tracks and the impact of intercultural education in terms of diversity in curricula and teaching materials.

Teaching quality and class sizes

Several national studies have shown that teaching quality is one of the most important school-level factors influencing student outcomes, regardless of socio-economic and demographic factors. While the impact of smaller classes on mainstream influence seems to be modest, a substantive body of literature shows that class size reductions do have a large and significant effect on disadvantaged students, including migrants, ethnic minorities and low-income children with low-educated parents. Moreover, the effect is greatest for younger children in earlier grades, particularly from kindergarten to third grade.

Access to early childhood education

Analysis of 2003 PISA data shows that participation in pre-school is strongly associated with better education outcomes at age 15, even when socio-economic background is considered. However, it is very difficult to establish whether other factors have contributed to better outcomes and whether these policies also work in other contexts.

Greater challenges, more ambitious policies

For example, the Migration Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) compares EU government’s policies towards access, support and monitoring of immigrants from pre-primary to higher education along 22 sub-indicators. Narrower gaps, smaller immigrant populations, and lower socio-economic levels are associated with less inclusive migrant education policies. Countries with greater resources, larger numbers of immigrant students, and wider achievement gaps tend to adopt more inclusive migrant education policies. Indeed, migrant achievement gaps are often a justification for changes in policy. We have observed the same trend in other areas. Generally, the countries that have adopted ambitious targeted policies also seem to be facing a relatively larger integration challenge. In this regard, the EU migrant integration indicators help to identify policy trends across the EU. Currently, they cannot be used to answer, however, whether more favourable policies are effective in increasing

integration outcomes according to the outlined EU indicators.

2.3.3 Which integration policy factors influence social inclusion outcomes?

It seems that there are hardly any social policies targeted specifically at immigrants as most social policies in the field of poverty reduction apply to the whole population. There are some studies assessing whether social benefits reduce poverty more or less for immigrants and others that investigate whether immigrants receive more benefits than non-immigrants. However, for the most part the link between social policies and migrant integration remains largely under-researched.

2.3.4 Which integration policy factors influence active citizenship outcomes?

Naturalisation policies have a significant effect on immigrants' acquisition of citizenship. Researchers have used several citizenship policy indexes and come up with very similar results. Using MIPEX, many researchers have found positive correlations between countries' policies and naturalisation rates: the more restrictive the policy, the lower the overall rate. Eurostat's bivariate analysis finds that naturalisation policies explain 50% of the variation in Member States' naturalisation rates. Other colleagues focused on one immigrant group (Turks) and observed that differences in policies explained 43% of the variation in their naturalisation rates across 11 EU Member States. According to forthcoming EU funded project ACIT, immigrants from developed countries are more likely to naturalise in countries that facilitate naturalisation, while immigrants from developing countries are twice as likely. The dual citizenship policy of countries of origin also impacts naturalisation rates. According to the ACIT analysis, immigrants who come from countries allowing dual nationality are 88 percent more likely to naturalise in their new country of residence. Immigrants become citizens and long-term residence more often in countries where the process is more inclusive and where dual citizenship is accepted in both the country of origin and destination. Shorter residence requirements, acceptance of dual citizenship, some forms of birth-right citizenship, and support to pay naturalisation requirements are examples that can boost active citizenship of immigrants.

The interaction between citizenship acquisition and integration is a complex one. The acquisition of citizenship is not only a result of immigrants' integration, but also a status that further

improves their social, economic, and political integration. Evidence of citizenship's impact on integration has been collected by researchers, including the OECD and the ACIT project. Some longitudinal studies find that naturalised immigrants tend to obtain better-paid and higher-skilled jobs, especially in the public sector. The most vulnerable immigrant groups are most likely to see their economic integration improve through naturalisation: first generation from low-income countries, the second generation, and in some cases groups with low employment rates. Citizenship can reduce real (or perceived) legal barriers and administrative costs for hiring immigrants. It is also a signal that somebody wants to settle long-term which increases incentives for employers to invest in an employee.

Long-term residence

Few quantitative research exists on the factors influencing long-term residence, partly due to the inavailability of data. The project's bivariate analysis used recently made available data on all national and EU permits. A slightly positive relationship emerges between long-term residence policies and the share of long-term residents. The more inclusive the policy, the more third-country nationals are long-term residents. The project's bivariate analysis also found a slightly negative relationship between naturalisation policies and the share of long-term residents. The more restrictive the naturalisation policies, the more third-country nationals are long-term residents.

Citizenship and long-term residence are only two elements of active citizenship. Other forms of political participation of migrants such as voting, membership and/or participation in organisations, running for or holding a political office, volunteering or participating in social movements and protests are to be further explored to capture immigrant's political and civic involvement.

CHAPTER 3: The Relevance of EU migrant integration indicators

This section of the report discusses how already identified and possible additional EU indicators are relevant for integration. All existing and any proposed EU integration indicators are assessed in terms of their relevance for EU objectives,

national policies, and the research-evidence base. National and international studies have identified the relationships between different integration outcomes and policies. This project's research looked at the scientific relevance of the Zaragoza indicators. These and other integration indicators are ideally modelled on existing or proposed EU indicators and targets in various areas of European cooperation and on existing ways of calculating and collecting data.

In this regard, relevant indicators are either important for EU objectives, measured in national monitoring reports or associated by research evidence to have an association with migrant integration outcomes and policies. Most proposed additional indi-

cators comply with the relevance criteria outlined in the 2009 Swedish EU Presidency's Conference Conclusions.¹⁵ Taking into consideration the discussions at the seminars on existing examples of national integration monitoring and bearing in mind the definition of integration as a two way process, this project proposes to add a new area, namely Indicators of a 'Welcoming Society'.

Regarding all indicators, improving the data to better measure outcomes for immigrants can and is already partly be done within the existing cooperation and resources shared by Eurostat and the National Statistical Institutes. Further boosting can be done through the voluntary action of National Statistical Institutes.

List of Zaragoza indicators and proposed additional indicators

	EMPLOYMENT	EDUCATION	SOCIAL INCLUSION	ACTIVE CITIZENSHIP	WELCOMING SOCIETY
ZARAGOZA INDICATORS	Employment rate	Highest educational attainment	At-risk-of-poverty (and social exclusion)	Naturalisation rate	Perceived experience of discrimination (survey)*
	Unemployment rate	Tertiary attainment	Income	Share of long-term residence	Trust in public institutions (survey)*
	Activity rate	Early school leaving	Self-reported health status (controlling for age)	Share of elected representatives (research)*	Sense of belonging (survey)*
	Self-employment	Low-achievers (PISA)	Property ownership	Voter turnout (research)*	
	Over-qualification	Language skills of non-native speakers (LFS module)**			
PROPOSED NEW INDICATORS	Public sector employment	Early childhood education and care (SILC/PISA)**	Child poverty (SILC)	Participation in voluntary organisations (survey)*	Public perception of racial/ethnic discrimination (Eurobarometer)
	Temporary employment	Participation in lifelong learning (LFS, AES)	Self-reported unmet need for medical care (SILC)	Membership in trade unions (survey)*	Public attitudes to political leader with ethnic minority background (Eurobarometer)
	Part-time employment	Not in education, employment or training (LFS)	Life expectancy (SILC)	Membership in political parties (survey)*	
	Long-term unemployment	Resilient students (PISA)**	Healthy life years (SILC)	Political activity (survey)*	
	Share of foreign-diplomas recognised (survey)**	Concentration in low-performing schools (PISA)**	Housing cost overburden (SILC)**		
	Retention of international students (research)*		Overcrowding (SILC)**		
			In-work poverty-risk (SILC)		
		Persistent poverty-risk (SILC)			

Note: One star (*) marks indicators for which data needs to be collected or migrant sample sizes boosted. Two stars (**) mark indicators for which data is not available every year (ad hoc basis). The authors of this study propose a new category of indicators of the 'welcoming society'. It includes the already proposed Zaragoza indicators 'perceived discrimination', 'trust in public institutions' and 'sense of belonging'.

(15) Relevance criteria: Within one of four agreed areas; long and stable for data collection; existing and comparable for most Member States; limited in number; comparable in time; productive and cost-effective; simple to understand and easy to communicate; focused on outcome; subjective and objective

3.1 The relevance of EU migrant employment indicators

The existing migrant employment indicators are relevant for the general EU employment targets as well as integration policymakers and researchers. The first three core indicators – **activity, unemployment, and employment rates** – are strongly correlated to one another and measure the same aspects of labour market participation. One of the EUROPE 2020 Headline targets for inclusive growth—the *75% employment rate for women and men aged 20-64*—can be achieved by getting more people into work, including through the integration of migrants. The unemployment rate clearly demonstrates labour market disadvantages of the first and second generation.

Two additional indicators measure relevant aspects of the labour market: the ‘quality’ of employment (**over-qualification**) and type of employment (**self-employment**). Over-qualification rates and gaps are relatively easy-to-interpret and relevant in nearly all EU countries, where employers may waste the skills and qualifications of foreign/foreign-born men and women, especially non-EU migrants.¹⁶ This project proposes one additional core employment indicator: public sector employment. **Public sector employment** is not just an indicator of the quality of employment. For the public sector to reflect the public that it serves, this indicator serves as a benchmark for long-term integration, particularly for naturalised immigrants and the second-generation. LFS includes information on occupational sector (e.g. education, health care). As was done by the OECD study ‘settling in’ (2012), public sector employment could be defined as

people working in occupations most likely to be funded by the public sector, such as public administration, human health and social work activities or education.

On an ad hoc basis, EU integration monitoring could report on other employment indicators, such as those raised by international research, seminar participants and the European Commission’s Directorate General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion. For example, part-time and temporary employment rates can be monitored for immigrants as key indicators of **under-employment**. In addition, further **dis-aggregations** by gender, education level and age group would demonstrate some of key determinants of migrant employment outcomes. The retention of international students was also raised by a few participants as a possible indicator of a favourable situation for labour market integration, even if this statistic is used traditionally to capture ‘brain drain’ and recently in some countries to indicate highly-skilled immigration.

3.2 The relevance of EU migrant education indicators

The Zaragoza migrant education indicators cover most of the relevant Europe 2020 and ET2020 benchmarks. For the second generation and for those who immigrated as children (the ‘1.5 generation’), the indicators on ‘tertiary’ and ‘highest’ educational attainment show not only their achievements, but also the areas for improvement in the educational system.¹⁷ ‘Early school leavers’ are those people who have only achieved pre-primary, primary or lower secondary education. The ‘low-achieving 15-year-olds in reading, mathematics and sciences,’ an established ET2020 benchmark, shows the share of students who do not reach baseline proficiency. Within these indicators, the outcomes of the second generation can be a long-term ‘benchmark’ for integration. A good education brings benefits throughout a person’s life, regardless of their employment status. Both first-generation immigrants and the welcoming society want to see improvements for the second generation as a sign of social mobility.

Points of discussion: Despite its overall usefulness, the activity rate is slightly harder to interpret as an integration indicator, since immigrants are on average younger than the general population and thus more likely to be younger studying or raising a family. This is why we recommend using this indicator with specific age groups (e.g. 25-54) to ensure better comparability. The interpretation of self-employment is also subject to debate, as migrants may turn to self-employment as an escape from long-term unemployment, discrimination, language barriers, or labour market restrictions. If any new indicator is not based on LFS or SILC, then data must be collected, e.g. on application or recognition rates for foreign qualifications (LFS).

(16) There is more information on how to measure and interpret the over-qualification rate in the discussion paper for the Berlin expert seminar on Employment in the context of this project. For the definition of overqualification, see glossary attached to this document.

(17) So far, data on second generation are not available from the core LFS but only in the ad-hoc modules. The next ad-hoc module is planned in 2014 (the previous one was carried out in 2008).

This project proposes that the two remaining ET2020 benchmarks are relevant core indicators for migrant education: **participation in early childhood education and care and participation in lifelong learning** (i.e. adult participation in any forms of education or training). As noted by the EU Council in 2011, the ET2020 benchmark on adult learning is relevant for newcomers, who are under-represented in lifelong learning. Training helps them develop their potential, adapt to the local labour market, and improve their social participation. Increasing access to high quality early childhood education and care is also an integration priority raised by the EU council in 2009 and in their national integration policies.

Other migrant education indicators may interest the Commission and Member States. The share of people currently “not in education, employment, or training” (NEETs) captures the opportunities for training for unemployed or inactive people, either for young people aged 18-24 or more broadly for immigrant adults. Additional indicators have limited availability of migrant-specific variables. Disaggregation by age at migration, language spoken at home, and parents’ socio-economic status (including education level) are worthwhile. PISA data can be used every three years to monitor disaggregations and indicators proven to influence outcomes, such as the concentration of immigrant pupils in schools with above-average shares of economically disadvantaged pupils and ‘resilient students’ - those coming from a disadvantaged socio-economic background but attaining high scores by international standards.

Points of discussion: For people who immigrated as adults, the ‘highest’ and ‘tertiary’ educational attainment indicators include both domestically-trained and foreign-trained people. Disaggregation by age at immigration would distinguish between these two groups.

For the indicator ‘participation in early childhood education and care,’ a difference of a few percentage points in participation rates between immigrant and native children can have a major impact on the educational careers of those children affected. To capture these small differences, countries would need to improve EU-SILC migrant sample sizes (see this project’s data assessment report). Measuring language skills of non-native speakers would require several indicators in an EU-funded targeted survey or ad hoc module.

3.3 The relevance of EU migrants’ social inclusion indicators

Immigrants are a critical target group for the EU’s overall strategy on social inclusion and fighting poverty. As an overarching concept, social inclusion can be a priority for national integration policies and research. A basic income, housing, and good health are related to other areas of integration and may be pre-conditions for immigrants’ participation in society.

In most EU countries, the general population has generally higher incomes and a lower risk-of poverty-or-social-exclusion than the foreign-born, especially non-EU newcomers. Income is measured by the **median annual equalised disposable income**. The EU’s overall target in this area is **the risk of poverty or social exclusion**. This composite indicator combines the share of those at risk of poverty, severely materially deprived or living in households with very low work intensity.

The EU integration indicators could include more key EU indicators on social inclusion and social protection, which are relatively easy-to-calculate using EU-SILC. Europe 2020 has a major focus on **child poverty**—across the EU, the risk-of-poverty for the children of foreign-born parent(s) is two-to-five times greater than for the children of the native-born. Additional indicators for discussion are **in-work poverty-risk** and **persistent poverty-risk**. ‘In-work at-risk-of-poverty’ monitors whether employment is a sufficient protection against poverty, since indeed immigrants are more likely to be in low-paying, temporary, or part-time jobs. **Persistent at-risk-of-poverty** provides insights into whether labour market activation policies are appropriate for long-term unemployed immigrants.

On health, **self-reported health status** can be reported at aggregate level and after controlling for age and gender. **Life expectancy, healthy life years, and self-reported unmet need for medical care** (see annex) are key indicators for the EU’s OMC on Social Inclusion and Social Protection. They can be calculated based on available demographic data primarily through SILC, subject to reliability tests. Using self-reported health status and needs as well as life expectancy and healthy life years provides a useful combination of commonly used subjective and objective measures for further investigation of the health situation of immigrants in Europe.

On housing, foreigners and foreign-born people often live in insecure and overcrowded housing and face greater housing costs. **Property ownership** is

an indicator of immigrants' long-term settlement in the country as well as a protection from discrimination on the rental market. In addition, **overcrowding** and **housing cost overburden** are two key general EU social inclusion indicators relevant for immigrants across Europe. Nearly 1 in 4 people in deprived or overcrowded housing in OECD countries live in an immigrant household. The housing cost overburden rate allows policymakers to assess how housing costs affects immigrants' poverty and quality of life.

Points of discussion: Further disaggregation of the social inclusion indicators would be useful to identify more vulnerable groups, such as households with children, the elderly or long-term unemployed. Still, users should keep in mind that social exclusion cannot be fully captured through statistics, especially for the hardest-to-reach.

3.4 The relevance of EU migrants' active citizenship indicators

The EU has a broad policy agenda on active citizenship involving many institutions. Active citizenship is about the acquisition and the exercise of equal rights and responsibilities for immigrants and citizens. When immigrants take up and use equal rights and responsibilities, they send a strong signal to themselves and others about their sense of belonging in the country. Beyond this symbolic value, this process can improve immigrants' social, economic, and political participation, the public's perceptions of immigrants, and the democratic legitimacy of the state. On several occasions, ministers responsible for integration have agreed that immigrants should have the opportunity to naturalise, become long-term residents, and participate in the democratic process because these achievements support their integration and enhance their sense of belonging. Each of the EU's migrant active citizenship indicators is also supported by specific standards on active citizenship that Member States have agreed together at EU level.

Indicators on naturalisation, long-term residence, and civic participation are just as relevant as the other integration indicators because they also capture the different national contexts. For example, naturalisation is not simply the results of citizenship policies, but also the differences in immigrant populations and other policies in the country of residence and origin. The country of origin, duration of residence, and socio-economic participation are all related to naturalisation. Furthermore, naturalised immigrants generally have better integration outcomes than non-naturalised immigrants, often even after controlling for other factors. Not only

may naturalisation help immigrants become more integrated. But also more integrated immigrants may be more likely to naturalise. Active citizenship indicators like naturalisation can therefore be seen as both a final step in a process and as a tool to further improve integration in several areas of life.

The share of immigrants who acquired permanent or long-term residence is a relevant outcome measure for long-term residence. Long-term residence can now be measured as both the EU long-term residence permit (2003/109) and any other type of national long-term residence permit. The resulting indicator describes how common or uncommon it is for non-EU residents to have long-term residence and, by extension, the same socio-economic rights and responsibilities as nationals.

The share of immigrants who acquired citizenship is a long-standing indicator in national and international research on immigrant integration. Naturalisation is a reliable and meaningful measure of the outcomes of policies and of other key contextual factors, such as immigrants' motivation to naturalise, duration of residence, and settlement in the country. This indicator opens an important debate about the importance of these policies and other factors. Multiple measures of naturalisation complete the picture of citizenship acquisition. 'The share of naturalised immigrants' can measure on an ad hoc basis how many immigrants have become citizens over time (See Annex). A third measure could be an estimate of the 'naturalisation of eligible immigrants', calculated as either a share or rate and based on countries' ordinary requirement for years of residence.

Points of discussion: The 2010 Zaragoza Declaration observed that 'there is currently no unified view among Member States on indicators in the area of active citizenship'. It explained that governments have different interpretations of active citizenship, depending on their political views, goals, and regulatory frameworks for integration policies. This project shows how active citizenship indicators can be used to measure the acquisition and use of rights, as both a means and an ends for successful integration. Analysis of these indicators thus provides governments and stakeholders an evidence-base to debate their different views, goals, and policies. This debate reveals the general need for greater research on both the effects of integration outcomes, including active citizenship, on other areas of integration as well as the links between their policy objectives and their policy outcomes.

Civic and political participation

This project proposes that the active citizenship indicators measure not only the acquisition but also the exercise of rights and responsibilities, namely civic and political participation. Beyond the existing additional indicators on **the share of immigrants among elected representatives and voter turnout among eligible immigrants**, the standard indicators of civic and political participation are **membership in voluntary organisations, membership in trade unions, membership in political parties, and political activities (e.g. contacting politicians, petitions, boycotts, demonstrations)**. These indicators would illustrate the process of civic and political participation before and after naturalisation. In particular, disaggregation for naturalised citizens and foreigners would capture the levels of participation for immigrants who cannot or do not want to naturalise, since citizenship is not a requirement for all forms of democratic participation. Immigrants' participation can currently only be measured internationally by pooling data over long periods of time. To capture this data, the EU can invest in a targeted survey of immigrants or boosting immigrant samples in the European Social Survey or EU-SILC's ad hoc module on social participation. Methodologies are also available to measure immigrants' sense of belonging and representation in political and decision-making bodies. Both aspects were highlighted as a potentially complex to capture but significant complementary element to analyse integration in this area.

3.5 The relevance of EU indicators of a welcoming society

This project proposes for discussion indicators to measure how the receiving society plays a role for migrant integration. The way that the 'receiving society' perceives integration can have a serious impact on the how immigrants integrate into society. These more 'subjective' measurements can be used complementary to more 'objective' integration outcome indicators. In every expert seminar, participants asked for indicators that measure integration as the two-way process of mutual accommodation, as stated by the first EU Common Basic Principle. Many national monitors already use such indicators. Alternatively, these indicators could be part of the existing four areas.

These indicators capture the cross-cutting issues of discrimination and the subjective attitudes of the general public and of immigrants them-

selves. Similar indicators crop up in integration monitoring at local, national, and international level (e.g. OECD, ILO). The 2010 Zaragoza Declaration has already named additional indicators that are relevant as indicators of a welcoming society: **experiences of discrimination; trust in public institutions; and sense of belonging**. Using these 'subjective' indicators, initial European research has found that the 'sense of belonging' and 'trust in political institutions' among the foreign-born is related to other integration outcomes and tends to converge with those of natives over time. Moreover, a significant body of national and international research exists on measuring discrimination, whether through the ILO's situation testing or minorities' own perceptions (e.g. EU-MIDIS study). This subjective data can be collected through a targeted immigrant survey or boosting immigrant samples in existing European surveys. It is less reliable to pool existing survey data over a period of, for example, more than three years; however, this can be a cost-effective, short-term option.

So far, none of the existing EU indicators directly address the general public. The Eurobarometer asks the public about their awareness of discrimination towards immigrants. The same public questions on discrimination are conducted annually by Eurostat's Eurobarometer service. This project proposes to use two key indicators – **public perception of ethnic discrimination in the country and public attitudes towards a political leader with an ethnic minority background**. Around half of EU citizens (56 %) still think that ethnic discrimination is widespread in their country – and more so than other grounds of discrimination. Beneath this EU average lays a wide gulf in public perceptions of ethnic discrimination in different EU Member States. In addition, Europeans are still only slightly comfortable with the idea that someday their country could be led by a person with an ethnic minority background. On a scale from 0-10, the average European put their comfort level with a female president or prime minister at a 8,6. For an ethnic minority candidate, they gave a 6,5. The average European would only feel more uncomfortable with someone under 30, over 75, or transgendered or transsexual. While ethnic discrimination and ethnic minorities cover wider groups than persons with an immigrant background, these public attitudes are a helpful barometer for specific attitudes towards diverse immigrant groups, particularly those with different racial and ethnic backgrounds. As noted earlier in this report, the public's openness and awareness of discrimination tends to be greater in countries with significant gaps in integration outcomes and more inclusive integration policies.

Indicators of the welcoming society could be used to facilitate how public opinion and perception of discrimination influence integration outcomes – a link which receives growing attention in research.

CHAPTER 4: Migrant integration and the Europe 2020

The Europe 2020 Strategy is the European Union's ten-year growth strategy. It sets out overall targets in the area of employment, education, environment, poverty and social exclusion. All Member States have committed to achieving Europe 2020 targets and have translated them into national targets and policies. The targets are coordinated through monitoring, coordination and reporting in the framework of the European Semester, a yearly cycle of economic policy coordination. The Europe 2020 targets are relevant for immigrant integration, namely employment, early school leaving, tertiary education, poverty or social exclusion.

However, **migrant integration has so far not sufficiently been mainstreamed into main EU policy areas despite the fact that there are well-functioning policy mechanisms in place.** Only a few indicators used in these mechanisms have been disaggregated for immigrants even when data allows for such break-downs. The outcomes of the Analysis Report can be used to incorporate immigrant integration into the monitoring and target setting of established policy frameworks in employment, education and social inclusion.

Closing the gap

This report outlines relevant factors that influence migrant integration to inform integration policies at various levels of governance. Integration policy often aims at closing the gap between immigrants and non-immigrants in the EU. Providing equal opportunities for immigrants and delivering specific support are important because immigrants are a particular vulnerable group. Furthermore, society as a whole benefits from closing the gaps between people with and without an immigrant background, in particular where and when immigrants are or become a large part of the population.

Between 10-15% of the total population in EU-15 countries were foreign-born in 2010. Immigrants are particularly overrepresented among younger age groups in many countries. According to a Eurostat working paper on demographic projections of the foreign-born population in EU countries from 2010, the share of foreign-born is likely to more than double by 2061. The most conservative projection estimates that 26.5 % of the EU population would have a 'foreign background' by 2061. By 2061, at least every third person in Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Germany, Greece, Luxemburg, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom is estimated to have a foreign background. As the relative importance of immigrants in our society increases, the outcomes of migrant integration become more relevant for where the general society is heading.

If policymakers in a Member State want to reduce the number of students leaving schools without a degree, they have to take into account the particular challenges of immigrants as they represent a large share of new children in school in many countries. They then may wish to compare this group with their peers without an immigrant background and control for gender and socio-economic background.

To illustrate the impact of effectively integrating immigrants into the EU agenda, the project has calculated a 'closing the gap-scenario' using several indicators as examples. The 'closing the gap-scenario' assumes equal outcomes of the migrant population in comparison with the total population. Based on this hypothetical scenario, we show the potential impact of complete convergence of outcomes on overall improvement and on meeting the respective Europe 2020 targets (see annex for full list).¹⁸

Currently, the total employment rate in the EU is 69 %. The employment rate for the foreign-born is 64 %. The Europe 2020 target is to increase the overall rate to 75 %. Closing the employment gap for foreign-born immigrants accounts for 10.7 % of meeting the Europe 2020 target across all EU countries for which targets and data are available. Given the 'no gap scenario', Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden would half-way meet their national Europe 2020 target (see annex).

Member States could prevent half a million people from leaving school early, if they could close

(18) Our calculations are based on Eurostat data which is available online. We take the rates and population sizes for 2010. The Europe 2020 targets are based on the National Reform Programmes of April 2011. Data was not available for Romania and Slovakia in most cases. These calculations could be done for a comparison between the native born and foreign –born population.

the gap for migrants. This accounts for 8.7 % of all early school leavers in the EU. The EU as a whole would be 30 % closer its headline target of reducing the early school leaver rate from 14 to 10 %. The 'no gap scenario' accounts for more than 50 % of reaching the target in Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Germany, Greece, and Italy. In fact, Sweden would exceed its national education target (see Annex).

23 % of the EU population is at risk of poverty or social exclusion. The rate is 9 % higher for the foreign-born population (32 %). If this gap were closed, the EU could lift 3.3 million immigrants out of poverty or social exclusion. This number accounts for 5 % of all people at risk of poverty or social exclusion in the EU. This stands for 17 % of all people at risk of poverty or social exclusion in

Austria, 19 % in Belgium, and almost 19 % in Sweden. Closing the gap for immigrants would bring the whole of the EU 16.2 % closer to reaching its headline poverty target. The migrant gap represents more than 50 % of the national targets in Austria, Belgium, Greece, and the Netherlands.

Of course, the 'no gap scenario' is unlikely in the short run. It is based on targets and population statistics that are subject to constant changes. However, this exercise is useful to emphasise that **immigrants play a significant role for Europe in reaching its overall targets**. Mainstreaming migrant integration into established monitoring and target setting mechanism at EU level is crucial to account for the (increasing) relative importance of the migrant population in many EU countries.

The 'closing the gap – scenario' for the Europe 2020 headline

	Rate of the total population, % 2010	Rates of the foreign-born, % 2010	Europe 2020 Target (2011)	The number of people lifted out of poverty risk or social exclusion given the 'no migrant gap scenario'	% of all people that would be lifted out of poverty risk or social exclusion given the 'no migrant gap scenario'	Share of 'no migrant gap' of reaching the Europe 2020 targets, in %
EU25 (w/o RO, SL)	23	32	20000000	3249117	49	16.2
Belgium	20	40	380000	225665	19.6	59.4
Bulgaria	37	45	260000	3654	1.9	1.4
Czech Republic	14	24	Remain the same	34488	3.7	
Denmark	19	39	22000 low work intensity	76707	12.2	
Germany	21	28	33000 long-term unemployed	598311	5.8	
Estonia	22	26	Only risk of poverty	5749	3.2	
Ireland	29	31	186000	9213	1.2	5.0
Greece	28	51	450000	230768	12.0	51.3
Spain	25	36	1450000	564851	7.7	39.0
France	20	32	Only risk of poverty	629175	8.5	
Italy	24	34	2200000	391679	4.4	17.8
Cyprus	20	31	27000	11718	11.4	43.4
Latvia	37	40	121000	7972	1.5	6.6
Lithuania	34	37	170000	3710	0.5	2.2
Luxembourg	18	22	x	5601	10.2	
Hungary	30	26	450000	-13844	-0.7	-3.1
Malta	19	23	6560	928	1.9	14.2
Netherlands	16	28	100000	181759	11.2	181.8
Austria	16	30	235000	139409	17.0	59.3
Poland	28	27	1500000	-409	0.0	0.0
Portugal	24	24	200000	-2638	-0.2	-1.3
Romania	40	:	580000			
Slovenia	18	27	40000	17916	7.5	44.8
Slovakia	20	27	170000	0		
Finland	17	40	150000	42716	7.9	28.5
Sweden	14	28	x	142747	18.7	
United Kingdom	21	28	x	379597	4.9	