

Nationalized Citizenship in Central European Countries

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Abstract:

Author argues that ethnization of principles upon which the state is build does not lead to awaking of the exalted nationalism. Problems of most of Central European countries are attached to an existence of banal nationalism, to the depth and permanence of nationalistic practices rooted in everyday activities and rituals. Although there are differences in constitutional codifications among Central European countries, citizens of these countries remain reduced into the membership in one collectivity – ethnical one. Natural coexistence of different national identities or of national identity with other collective identities is being questioned in Central Europe. Text analyzes discourses that lead to systemic nationalization of the concept of citizenship in Central European countries. Countries of Central Europe in some aspects neglect modern understanding of citizenship by, for instance, putting too much focus on rights of ex-patriots and communities living outside of the “mother country”. Confusion is visible mostly in inconsistent approaches to citizenship by mixing – “ius soli” and “ius sanguinis” principles. Author uses concepts of Jeffrey Alexander and his distinction of the “core” and “out” group within a society and evolutionist theory of Castles and Davidson to describe reasons behind deviation from egalitarian and inclusive concepts of citizenship. Author analyzes citizenship policies and trans-border affinities in Central Europe on the example of two countries – Slovakia and Hungary that are unfortunate examples of these phenomena. Finally, author analyzes pre-conditions of shift from ethno-cultural to legal-political definition of a nation and potential for redefinition of the core solidarity based on ethnicity to core solidarity based on modern citizenship.

Key words:

Ethnization; nation; citizenship; de-ethnization; civic and ethnic traditions; constitutional codifications; minority policies; ex-patriot policies; identity changes; civility and primordiality; re-definition of a nation; core and out groups.

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1. CHANGES OF CITIZENSHIP CONCEPT IN GLOBALIZED TIMES

Modern citizenship is inherently egalitarian and it has been almost universally appealing since the dawn of modernity to majority of ideological streams of society (Faulks 2000). In its egalitarian mode citizenship has developed within liberal tradition and it turns to be a powerful idea – it recognizes the dignity of the individual but at the same time reaffirms the social context in which the individual acts. In liberal tradition, citizenship is portrayed as part of an evolutionary process towards a more rational, just and well-governed society (see for instance Marshall 1981). Citizenship therefore can be characterized as a membership status, which contains a package of rights, duties and obligations, and which implies equality, justice and autonomy. Citizenship itself could be thin and thick – rich sense of citizenship can only be achieved when the contextual barriers to its performance are recognized and removed.

One of these contextual barriers turned to be soon after the French revolution. On the one hand, liberalism, as the dominant ideology of citizenship, has stressed egalitarian and universal nature of the status (Faulks 2000). On the other hand, citizenship has been bound right from the beginning closely to the institution of the nation-state. Since 19th century, citizenship turned to be a meaningful status only in strong connection with the nation-state. Citizenship derives its power from the nation-state that represents often uneasy symbiosis of ethnic and civic elements. Countries, naturally so, differ significantly in the level they strengthen ethnic or civic elements.

Different dimensions of the modern citizenship that show both ethnic and civic elements have been described well by Brubaker (2002). Modern citizenship, according to Brubaker, ought to be egalitarian, democratic, socially consequential, sacred, national, and unique. While the first three of them (egalitarian, democratic, socially consequential) are following strictly civic tradition, others (sacred, national, unique) are from the ethnic dimension. The first three dimensions are present in all concepts of modern citizenships and we can find them in all modern states. Differences between states are therefore in presence of the later ones. In all Central European countries citizenship is being perceived to certain extent sacred, national and unique, although there are naturally differences in between them (more on the topic in chapter 3.).

2. CITIZENSHIP IN CENTRAL EUROPE AND UNDERSTANDING OF A NATION

Civil society is always able to generate ethnic communitarianism and nationalistic ideas that can even destroy it. Civic and ethnic traditions very often influence each other and politics of civic liberation goes often hand-in-hand with politics of ethnic identity (Taylor 1992). These ties between civic and ethnic politics are traditionally very strong in Central Europe – Polish Solidarity movement always have had traditional and nationalistic fractions, Hungarian nationalists came out of dissident movements, one stream of Slovak nationalistic traditions derived from the revolutionary structures of the Public Against Violence, etc.

Ethnic perception of a nation has not been historically necessarily anti-liberal and anti-democratic. Kymlicka rightly suggests that “*all existing nationalisms are complex mixture of liberal and non-liberal elements, although forms and depth of anti-liberalism is usually very different*” (Kymlicka 2001: 54). Nationalisms in Central Europe were differing since 19th century very much – from Polish aristocratic nationalism, through loyalist Hungarian nationalism, up to Czech economic nationalism or Slovak plebeian nationalism.

One element has been, however, common for all countries of the Central Europe – influence of the metaphysical and organic German nationalism. Herderian ideas suggesting that nation ought to overlap with a state were extremely influential in all countries of Central Europe. Habermas’ criticism over tribal and blood-based traditions of post-war Germany should be fully applied on most of Central European countries (see Habermas, 1998). The difference is, however, rather paradoxical – also thanks to long discussions initiated by Habermas Germany has been moving toward more inclusive and more civic practices of granting full citizenship to aliens. At the same time, policies of preferential treatment of ethnic Germans living on the Central and Eastern Europe have been slowly abolished. These patriarchal and strictly “*ius sanguinis*” policies were not abolished within Central Europe – actually they are in fact further developed, foster, and institutionalized by countries such as Slovakia and Hungary.

Challenges to modern citizenship that have been brought by processes of globalization provoked three very different theoretical answers. The first one can be represented by R. Brubaker (1992) who argues in favor of citizenship traditionalism, according to which there has been persistent

divergence between states' national citizenship laws and policies. The second one, represented by scholars such as Soysal (1994) argues that national citizenship is in decline all around the world and that there is a convergence across states toward post-national membership schemes. Joppke and Morawska (2003), however, argue that instead of simply reaffirming national citizenship traditions or of devaluing citizenship as such, recent experiences with immigration and appearance of the trans-state nomadic life has launched a trend toward the de-ethnicization of citizenship. Morawska and Joppke (2003) argue that citizenship in countries of EU is becoming attributed by birth on territory and constituted by political values rather than by ethnicity.

Bearing in mind developments in the EU in general, the position close to reality is undoubtedly the one of Morawska and Joppke. They rightly argue that one element of de-ethnicized citizenship is the resurgence of territorial "ius soli" citizenship in Europe. Previously exclusively "ius sanguinis" states came to complement their "ius sanguinis" rules with the "ius soli" rules. The second element of de-ethnicized citizenship is the increasing toleration of dual citizenship in Europe. A third element of de-ethnicized citizenship is the most important as far as Central European countries are concerned – relaxed attitude toward minority identities and practices of multiculturalism. In spite of all concerns that European multiculturalism is dead (Mason 1995), to be a citizen of a liberal democratic country increasingly does not mean to be a member of a cultural community – the only culture citizens are asked to share is the political culture of a liberal state.

But are these developments relevant for Central European countries as well? I argue that not in the extent that might be expected bearing in mind legislative changes conducted as a compulsory move toward EU membership. Firstly, practically all countries of Central European region were combining *ius soli* and *ius sanguinis* principles in the past and this chaos is up to the moment reflected in respective legislations. The process of getting rid of *ius sanguinis* principles will be therefore more complicated since they are overlapping in strange manners. Secondly, certain level of toleration of dual citizenship in Central Europe does not exclude trans-territorial ethnic-based legislative norms, or at least exemptions from the law, that go well-beyond non-ethnicized citizenship. Thirdly, the above mentioned thinning of naturalization requirements in liberal states somehow did not affect all of Central European countries. While civic codified Czech Republic follow the third element of de-ethnicized citizenship described by Joppke and Morawska, other countries such as Slovakia, are tightening

respective cultural community even more than in the past. In this sense, scissors are opening within Central Europe – some of countries (Czech Republic, to certain extent Poland) rather slowly follow the path of Germany, Belgium, or Spain, though others (Slovakia, Hungary, to certain extent Slovenia) do reaffirm national citizenship traditions.

3. CITIZENSHIP IN CENTRAL EUROPE AND CONSTITUTIONAL CODIFICATION

A choice between civic and ethnic traditions has been viewed for a long time as contradictory from ideological point of view. Legal analysis shows, however, that selection of either of these traditions is not possible and most of national democratic states have been established upon political compromises between ethnic and civic traditions (Beck 1997). Central European countries create from this perspective interesting group – they do create a “cocktail” of civic and ethnic traditions, although most of them are rather ethnically defined with many differences in constitutional codifications of a nation. Citizenship, albeit being a mixture of *ius soli* and *ius sanguinis* principles, is understood rather in ethnic terms. Lack of thinking in terms of post-national citizenship is characterizing all these countries.

Central European countries differ greatly in the way how a nation is constitutionally codified. These codifications do influence successful inclusion policies more than history, political representation, or even prevailing value orientation (Baršová 2003). An example of Visegrad group countries shows us a continuum from civic up to ethnic codifications:

1. Civic Codification (Czech Republic)
2. Patriotic mixture of ethnic and civic codifications (Poland)
3. Civic codification combined with externally focused ethnic codification (Hungary)
4. Ethnic codification that defines sovereignty of a “Volk” as a participation and cooperation between ethnic majority and minorities (Slovakia).

In all countries of this continuum, however, tension between civic and ethnic traditions is of crucial importance (see Bauböck 1999). These countries, at the same time, do not reject the importance of ethnic-cultural definitions of the “nation”. Even the Czech Republic reached its civic

codification rather in the process of negation of Slovak codification, than just as a result of long-term process of overcoming ethnic traditions of 19th century (Baršová 2003).

Tensions between civic and ethnic traditions within Czechoslovak federation caused a splitting of the country into two national states at the end of 1992. Consequently, constitutions of both successor states are excellent examples of a very different understanding of a nation and nationhood. Constitution of Slovakia is strictly ethnic; it is an expression of the ethnic dominance of ethnic Slovaks in their country. Any other groups living in a country therefore can be only tolerated; their equality within a system can be always questioned¹⁶⁵. The constitution of the Czech Republic, consequently, has been written as a reaction on Slovak ethnic approach toward nation and in result it constitutes by far the most civic defined constitution within Central Europe¹⁶⁶.

As far as Polish constitution is concerned, preamble constitutes an interesting mixture of civic and ethnic patriotism. Polish constitution is overwhelmed by notes and messages on history, traditions, religion, and culture, while these rather ethnic elements are overlapping with universal human values (Ossowski 1984: 114). In other words – Polish ethnic patriotism is worth of its constitutional protection since it is heading toward universal humanity and toward civic culture.

Hungary is another interesting case showing that Central European countries have difficulties or even structural reasons why they tend to mix civic and ethnic traditions (Schöpflin 2006). Preamble of the Hungarian constitution is without any doubts civic-oriented, there are no messages concerning history, culture, traditions, or religion. There is, however, rather controversial paragraph 6/3 that states that “*Hungary takes responsibility over destiny of Hungarians living outside of its borders and it will be strengthening their relations with Hungary*” (Mediansky 1995:108). In 1993, new law on citizenship has been adopted based on this paragraph that foster *ius sanguinis* principle. Following the logic of paragraph 6/3, former Prime-minister of Hungary Jozsef Antall stated at he beginning of transformation process that he consider himself a Prime-minister of all 15

¹⁶⁵ Recently (since 2006) this symbolic domination of ethnic Slovaks has been presented by Prime-minister Robert Fico who started to distinguish loyal and un-loyal minorities in 2007.

¹⁶⁶ The constitution of the Czech Republic define „nation“ exclusively in civic terms – citizenship, territorial unity, state history, universal values of human dignity, freedom, democracy a human rights.

million of Hungarians, it means both 10 million of those living in Hungary and 5 living outside of Hungary. Since the beginning of 1990s, ideological and political battles in Hungarian politics, as they are displayed by the paragraph 6/3, have been deepening. So-called Status Law that has been adopted in June 2001 is just a continuation of the battle of two antagonistic principles of Hungarian politics – internal civic codification combined with externally focused ethnic codification (Vašečka 2006).

4. ETHNIZATION OF THE CONCEPT OF CITIZENSHIP IN CENTRAL EUROPE – STRUCTURAL VIEW OF JEFFREY ALEXANDER

How can ethnization of the concept of citizenship be explained using sociological terms? Scholars tend to explain the process of ethnization by using historical reasons, traditions, description of a legal background, etc. Structural view of Jeffrey Alexander offers a sociological explanation that rather than asking a question “*How to include?*“ all members of society tend to ask a question “*Where to include?*“. Attempts to include the “others” in Central Europe usually show cleavages in majority identities, presence of the “other” always point out at cohesion and differentiation of the own community. According to Alexander (Alexander, 1988), modern national state has been established as a rational project and therefore there is hardly a space for irrationality without any function. What explains ethnization of otherwise egalitarian concept of citizenship is persistence of the *core group* an its *core solidarity*.

Nations were established by core-groups, whose members share certain characteristics and features, on which their solidarity was structured. Alexander suggests that each core-group needs an out-group. In Central Europe out groups are being defined ethnically and remnants of the „core“ solidarity is lasting until these days. Applying Alexander’s model on developments in Central Europe shows how continuum between civility (less emotional, on purpose constructed ties) and primordiality (preference of race, territorial, family, and religious ties) is switching systematically toward primordial sentiments in setting up principles for modern citizenships.

Author therefore suggests, applying Alexander’s model, that the crisis of non-ethnicized citizenship in case of the Central Europe is based precisely on inability to establish *the core* of the nation on other principles than ethnicity. Structural reason for failure of non-ethnicized policies in Central

Europe can be explained by permanence, depth, and strength of the core solidarity survival. Alexander has asked also a banal question that turned to be an important one – where the *other* came from? Alexander suggests that those who should be included these days and granted a *thick* citizenship have been previously excluded during the process of ethnical differentiation. Alexander suggests, therefore, that these people can be included by acquiring solidarity within so-called terminal group of society, where solidarity can be exercised in terminal situations of a society.

The problem of some of Central European countries is therefore connected with identification of the group that should be included, to whom solidarity should be displayed. Core solidarity is defined in countries such as Slovakia and Hungary according to ethnic lines, no matter of the national state borders. The *core* solidarity should be shifted from ex-patriots to citizens of the country or people with a denizenship status.

5. THE AIM OF MINORITY AND MIGRATION POLICIES IN CENTRAL EUROPE

It is questionable to what extent countries of the Central European region tend to include those who are not part of the ethnicized *core* group. As the author suggested, in some of Central European countries therefore autochthonous or so-called new (migrant) minorities are not objects of integration in all of its dimensions. Policies are aimed on the socio-economic dimension of integration and partially on the civic-political one. Cultural integration is very often not required – *out* groups are in fact not welcome to try to penetrate into the core group.

Hardly one can find a more inconsistent stand-point. In fact, there are examples in the history of Central European countries that at the moment the process was in full swing, the majority yielded to the *racist paradox*. This paradox occurs when the minority fulfills the original demand, but is nevertheless then rejected as a danger to the majority. The majority originally demands those ethnically different to be fully adapted. But in fact when several failed to do so, the majority is rejecting the group as a whole.

The *racist paradox*, first described by political scientist Rainer Bauböck (1994), is not after all a new phenomenon in Central Europe – the same “racist paradox” led to the slaughter of European Jews during the Second World War. German and other Central European nations demanded full assimilation from the Jews as a precondition of their possible integration into society. However, when minorities in many ways succeeded, especially

in Germany, the majority felt menaced, and produced a new conspiracy theory to explain the processes taking place within the Jewish community.

Just as Germany, Central European countries can overcome historical determinism as well – everything depends on how and whether it takes advantage of the opportunity provided. Shifting from a cultural definition of one's nation to a voluntary definition does not mean that one has to give up one's identity.

The important thing is that one's nation professes universal values. According to the German sociologist Jürgen Habermas (1998), such values include the rule of law and democracy. Habermas' "constitutional patriotism", as the basis of loyalty to nation and state, for the first time gives countries like Slovakia, or Hungary the chance to bind people's national loyalty not to an ethnic and cultural homeland, but to a legal and political space defined by the universal principles of freedom and equality. These countries too, if they intend to succeed in integrating "others" into society, should choose an *elective* Renanian definition of nation that allows political and legal identity to be separated from ethnic and cultural membership. Otherwise the whole discussion on integration of "others" who are part of out-groups is useless – minorities would have nowhere to integrate. Following thoughts of Habermas, Central European societies need a new partnership agreement. One chance had been a proposed EU citizenship – the project that has not been utilized at all yet.

6. EU CITIZENSHIP AS A LOST CHANCE

Nationalized citizenship of modern times that constituted an ontological security for its members is according to Castles and Davidson definitely gone (see Castles – Davidson 2000). Globalization in all of its dimensions challenges foundations of the national state construction. Even states locked in their voluntary autarchy are forced to face effects of globalization. States that are deeply rooted in ethnic definitions are increasingly facing conflicts that formulated within an ethnicized discourse. As Castles and Davidson (2000: vii) point out: "*Heterogeneity of cultural values and practices rises exponentially – there is hardly a time for processes of acculturation and assimilation*".

Example of countries of Central Europe shows, however, that public policy makers in these countries are not fully aware of paradigmatic changes that occurred over last few decades. Discussion on post-modern and multiple citizenship is missing in the public discourse and legislative

plans for future. A chance that has been brought by a failed project of the EU constitution was not utilized at all in Central European countries – it meant neither appearance of de-nationalized discourse on post-modern citizenship, nor beginning of a discussion on European citizenship and its aspects.

It would be false, however, to point-out fingers in this respect only at Central European countries. Unfortunately, as Faulks (2000: 159) rightly points out, the creation of EU citizenship at Maastricht failed to take an excellent opportunity to sever the link between nationality and citizenship. According to EU law, member states can still assert their right to determine citizenship of their communities and, EU citizenship is limited to those individuals who are citizens of member states.

And this is exactly the core of the problem that allows also Central European countries to continue ethnicized policies of citizenship and to divide citizens into two categories – dominant ethnic group and potentially marginalized groups of other ethnic origin. As O’Leary (1998:100) argues, EU is actually far from being post-national organization. It is rather encouraging an exclusive European identity that sets cultural as well as legal limits on the expansion of citizenship. On top of that, the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 asserted that EU citizenship was to complement and not supersede national citizenship.

In this respect it is starting to be clear, that EU did not utilize the unique chance to move toward postmodern citizenship, although historically some of founding members of the EU had better structural chances to undertake these changes than countries of Central Europe. Weak legal background that does not reflect characteristics of a postmodern citizenship has been displayed also at the European Parliament, in the course of a colloquium „*Europe of the Expatriates: the 26th Country of the Union?*“ that took place on April 28, 2005.

Participants representing twenty member associations equalized in terms of numbers foreign ex-patriots from EU countries to population of Turkey. At the same time they complained on treatment and overlooking, but most importantly they outlined future trends: *“In spite of diversity and disperse all around the world this Diaspora begins to unite. It does not have any doubts about its European identity in its everyday life”* (Vašečka 2006). Primordialism of the discourse of the above-mentioned colloquium is following the same lines as the trans-territorial attempts to extent citizenship in some of Central European countries.

7. REDEFINITION OF A NATION AND RE-CONSTRUCTION OF NATIONAL IDENTITIES

The more universal the definition of society's identity, the more particular contents and groups it is capable of including. From this viewpoint, when introducing post-national citizenship, the starting position of countries with prevalence of ethnic and cultural self-identification is more problematic than of those where civic and territorial self-identification prevails. Central European countries, however, have a room for overcoming the historical determinism and everything will depend on how and whether they will take advantage of it. The shift from cultural definition of the own nation towards the voluntaristic one is not necessarily a sign of giving up one's identity. Perhaps the post-modern Central European countries should re-define as the focal point of their identities to democracy, human rights and the rule of law instead of ethnically defined membership. Central Europeans can reach a new partnership agreement by systematic attempt to redefine and reconstitute their identities and to structure identity of a "core group" on territorial and constitutional basis, rather than on ethnic and endogamic basis as it is the case these days. The role of constitutional patriotism here is crucial, but countries of Central Europe should be cautious not to remove so called national identities completely. As Habermas suggests (1998) the role of constitutional patriotism is based upon inclusion and re-direction of national identities, pride and history. In other words in order to re-constitute national identity into post-modern one enabling appearance of the post-national citizenship we should not reject completely the role that history has played in shaping modern identities of respective nations.

Author argues that strengthening of particular and universalistic identities instead of national ones will be the greatest challenge for Central European countries in the future. As Stuart Hall suggests (1992: 300) that there are three scenarios as far as national identity is concerned:

1. Erosion of national identities due to cultural homogenization and global post-modernity;
2. Strengthening of particular or universalistic identities as a result of opposition against globalization;
3. Creation of new, hybrid identities.

In spite of on-going globalization processes hybrid identities will be replacing national identity only slowly. Focus should be much more on strengthening of universalistic and particular identities (local, regional) at

the same time. Coexistence of these two is not in contradiction – universalistic identity in the form of, for instance, European identity is not clashing with any particular identities. But there are also other chances how to avoid prevalence of ethnicized national identities. One of them could be re-surrection of pre-modern identities that were not ethnicized. Slovakia as the most ethnicized country of Central Europe might serve as an example.

Slovakia has been a part of the Greater Hungary until 1918. Until the moment when process of nationalization and so-called national emancipation started in 19th century, Slovaks, together with Magyars, Romanians, Germans, Croats, Serbs, Ruthenians and others possessed both territorial-based Hungarian identity (Ungarus) and their proto-national identities. Only 19th century and Herderian wave of nationalism forced people to chose – to become a Hungarian, but this time in the sense of Magyar identity. Hungarians started to mean Magyars and all non-Magyar ethnic groups had to choose – to identify themselves with Magyar modern nation or exclude themselves and to foster their particular national identities.

Therefore nowadays Slovak political nation should be build along several lines, but the beginning must be resurrection of Hungarian identity. This secondary “national awakening” might serve for reconciliation with Magyars, and for breaking tribal endogamic chains that excludes any successful accommodation of others into Slovak society. Author understands resurrection of Hungarian identity in 21st century Slovakia as a chance to bind Slovak appurtenance primarily not to an ethnic and cultural homeland, but to a legal and political one defined by the universalistic principles of freedom and equality.

8. REMOVAL OF PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT AND POLICIES TOWARD EX-PATRIOTS

Preferential treatment of ex-patriot communities are by far the best example of ethnicized understanding of a “core group” and broadly of a citizenship as well. Since Hungarian Status Law is well-known and discussed example of preferential treatment of foreign countries citizens, author attempts to bring example of similar Slovak law on “Foreign Slovaks” that in the course of years after 1989 became an untouchable group. A fact that their unique status within the Slovak legal system has not been criticized by any of relevant political or social group within the Slovak society is not a sign of intellectual failure but rather perfect example of dominance of the primordial and ethnical perception of a nation.

The rights of “foreign Slovaks” are guaranteed by the National Council of the Slovak Republic Act No. 70/1997 on Expatriate Slovaks. An Expatriate Slovak is a person to whom such the status can be granted on the basis of his/her Slovak nationality in a foreign country or Slovak ethnic origin and Slovak cultural and language awareness. For the purpose of this law, the direct ancestors up to the third generation with Slovak nationality are eligible. The applicants prove their Slovak nationality or Slovak ethnic origin by presenting supporting documents (as a birth certificate, baptism certificate, registry office statement, and a proof of nationality or permanent stay permit) (Divínsky 2004).

It is perhaps interesting that the applicants have to prove their Slovak cultural and language awareness by results of their current activities, by a testimony of a Slovak countrymen organization active in the place of residence of an applicant, or by a testimony of at least two Expatriate Slovaks living in the applicants’ country of residence. The applicants submit a written application for the recognition of the Slovak Expatriate Status to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Slovak Republic or abroad at a mission or a consular office of the' Slovak Republic. The Slovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs decides on the application within 60 days from its submission. In case the application is accepted, the Ministry through the respective mission of the Slovak Republic will issue the applicant a document (Expatriate Card), identifying him/ her as a Slovak Expatriate (Divínsky 2004).

What advantages does the status of foreign Slovak bring to its holders? For instance, the foreign Slovaks entering the territory of the Slovak Republic are not required to have a visa, if this is in harmony with bilateral agreements. They have also the right of permanent stay in the territory of the Slovak Republic – a circumstance that is very favorable for them. More importantly, the persons with the status of foreign Slovaks have the right to apply for admission to any educational institution in the territory of Slovakia, apply for employment without a work permit, apply for the state citizenship of the Slovak Republic, and request an exception from Social Security payments (Vašečka 2006). The foreign Slovaks have also the right to own and acquire real estates in the territory of the Slovak Republic, which is not the case for any other category of migrants or aliens in the country.

In the sense outlined above, the provisions of the Act on Expatriate Slovaks are fairly advantageous for this category of aliens and enable them many exceptions and benefits during their stay in Slovakia (Divínsky 2004). According to the Law on Foreign Slovaks (2005) the Office for Slovaks

Living Abroad has been established. The Office therefore symbolically but also legally operates in favor of endogamic, tribally defined group. It is more than obvious that these kinds of legal and institutional provisions are in sharp contradiction with a modern citizenship (see Vašečka 2006; Divínský 2007).

9. MOVING TOWARD POSTMODERN CITIZENSHIP

Countries of Central Europe on their long way toward post-national citizenship might follow the example of Germany with all of its recent constitutional changes. These countries are sharing the same tradition of tribal and blood-based affinities toward the state and therefore German example is worth of following. Today these countries are unlike Germany good examples of imposing a *Leitkultur* (see a discussion on Bassam Tibi's term *Leitkultur*: Hartwig 2005) over minorities. Even such practices, rejected by many these days in countries of EU15 could be described as a proof of a good will and openness.

But Keith Faulks (2000: 166) goes even further in his thinking about chances to impose post-national citizenship. He argues that postmodern theories fail to identify the problem that the existence of the state creates for a universal citizenship. While reforms of the state, to enhance the democratic and inclusive nature of its institutions, are a necessary move, they are not a sufficient step towards fulfilling citizenship's potential. As long as people live in a world divided by territorial states, Faulks argue, citizenship's egalitarian logic will remain unfulfilled. Postmodern citizenship must be according to Faulks detached from its modernist associations with the state. It is questionable, in this respect, whether detachment from national states of the EU will be sufficient. EU proved to be build for the moment on some of similar principles typical for member national states.

10. CONCLUSIONS

The notion of self-determination in Central and Eastern Europe was primarily found in the 19th century concept of nationalism. Unlike in Western Europe and the United States that draw on the ideas of the Enlightenment and individual freedom, in Central and Eastern European concept of self-determination was characterized by the primacy of the group defined by ethnic, cultural, and linguistic aspects.

Castles and Davidson (2000: 153) suggest that idea of civic inclusion, based upon democratic active citizenship can be sustained only under condition that cultural community will be replaced by political community. First of all, state should be undetached from an idea of nation and replaced by fully democratic state based upon open and flexible coexistence. Secondly, and this is even greater challenge, such forms of political participation should be invented that go beyond borders of the state. Living together cannot be based upon group cultural belonging, but at the same time it should not ignore it at the same time. New forms of belonging together should be based upon both principles of individual equality and upon principles of collective difference (Castles – Davidson 2000: ix)

To conclude author stresses following structural needs for Central European countries:

1. Need to re-define the national identities but to leave space for uniting universalistic principles in order to secure social cohesion of post-modern societies.
2. Need of transfer from ethno-cultural to legal-political definition of a nation
3. Need of redefinition of the core solidarity based on ethnicity to core solidarity based on postmodern citizenship.
4. Need to “sell” constitutional patriotism to people who are locked in the cage of banal nationalism.

These changes will certainly not happen in Central Europe in a short-term perspective. Lack of discussions, active policies, and legislative changes might however turn against interest of the whole EU. Otherwise some of Central European countries (such as Slovakia or Hungary) might turn to be real trouble-makers within the EU in its attempts to move closer toward post-national citizenship. EU did not utilize yet its chances in the process of constituting a European citizenship based on other principles than of an extension of particular national citizenships. But that does not mean that the process is irreversible.

Joppke and Morawska (2003) suggest that de-ethnicized citizenship is certainly not happening everywhere. Authors suggest that it is an exclusively Western phenomenon whose “*true galvanizer is not so much immigration as the transformation of the North-America region from the Hobbesian zone of war into a Lockean zone of trade*” (Joppke – Morawska, 2003: 19). Following this logic, countries of Central European region might be just post-pone in time, since they are enjoying “*Lockean zone of trade*”

just for less than two decades. Nevertheless, Central European countries showed rather spectacular abilities to speed up processes of catching up with the older EU members since 1989. Author suggests that this sphere should be put as a priority by policy makers of respective countries of the region.

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